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It’s now against the law to suck dick if you have a dick and you 
don’t tell the dick you’re sucking that you have a dick. Or if you 
used to have a dick. Or if you have a pussy when they think you 
have a dick. Or a pussy. Or something.
1
 
 
You are about to enter another dimension. A dimension not only of 
sight and sound, but of mind. A journey into a wondrous land of im-
agination. Next stop, the Twilight Zone!
2
  
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This article considers a series of recent cases where young transgender men 
have been successfully prosecuted for sexual offences in circumstances where 
their female cisgender partners claimed to be unaware of their gender histories. 
The article will (i) detail the legal background to these cases, (ii) offer a critique 
of the claims that non-disclosure of gender history serves to vitiate consent, 
constitute harm and provide evidence of deception, and (iii) provide three ar-
guments as to why criminalisation is inappropriate in any event. The arguments  
against criminalisation that will be advanced are that prosecution (i) produces 
legal inconsistency and is potentially discriminatory, (ii) unduly valorises the 
sexual autonomy of cisgender people, and (iii) is contrary to good public policy. 
In developing these arguments, the article will highlight how the ‘intelligibility’ 
of prosecution proceeds from a prior cisnormative framing of events.  
 
Keywords: transgender, cisgender, sexual autonomy, rape, consent, harm, deception.  
 
Introduction 
 
This article is a developed version of a paper presented at the Sexual 
Freedom, Equality & the Right to Gender Identity as a Site of Legal & 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Keele University, UK and Adjunct Professor, Queensland University of Technolo-
gy a.sharpe@keele.ac.uk  
 
1 P. Lees, ‘Should Trans People have to Disclose their Birth Gender before Sex’ Vice 2 July 2013 
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/should-trans-people-have-to-disclose-their-birth-gender-before-sex 
(last accessed: 12/11/15).  
2 Opening narration, Series 1: The Twilight Zone (1959) Fremantle Home Entertainment DVD (2011).  
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Political Struggle conference held in Oslo in December 2014.
3
 It consid-
ers one specific and important human rights issue, generally neglected 
within legal scholarship, namely, the successful prosecution of young 
transgender
4
 men for sexual offences based on ‘gender fraud.’ In  all cas-
es, judicial conclusions of ‘fraud’ have involved translation of apparently 
consensual and desire-led intimacy with cisgender
5
 women into non-
consensual relations on the basis of non-disclosure of gender history.
6
 
With few exceptions, convicted defendants have received custodial sen-
tences and have been placed on sex offenders registers for life, with all 
the additional implications for liberty and surveillance that this entails.
7
 
While this criminal (in)justice scenario has been replicated in the U.S.
8
 
                                                 
3 The conference was organised by the Department of Public and International Law, University of Oslo 
http://www.jus.uio.no/ior/english/research/projects/transgender/events/conferences/2014/gender-
identity-conference/program/ (last accessed: 12/11/15).  
4 The term transgender has become something of an umbrella term for all trans identified people (see 
K. Bornstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women and the Rest of Us (Routledge 1994); M. Bruce-Pratt, 
S/He (Firebrand Press 1995); L. Feinberg, Transgender Warriors: Making History from Joan of Arc to 
RuPaul (Beacon Press 1996); J. Cromwell, Transmen and FTMs: Identities, Bodies, Genders & Sexu-
alities (Chicago University Press 1999)). For the purposes of this article, it is used in the more limited 
sense to refer to people who feel incongruence between their gender identity and anatomy. The term 
transsexual is often used in this respect. However, the term transsexual fails to exhaust this group be-
cause many transgender people refuse the transsexual label because of its medical history and patholo-
gising effects (see A. Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (Cavendish 2002) 
Ch 2). 
5 Cisgender is a term coined by Julia Serrano (Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and 
the Scapegoating of Femininity (Seal Press 2007)). It refers to people who are comfortable with gender 
expectations and practices that follow normatively from sex designation. Cissexual refers to people 
who are comfortable in their sexed bodies. While this two terms normally align, some cissexual people 
are not cisgender. Queer people, in particular, tend to refuse the term cisgender. In this article, the term 
cisgender will be used to refer to complainants because it is the fact that they are cisgender, rather than 
cissexual, that is more pertinent to the bringing of prosecutions.  
6 The reader might question this claim, at least in the English context, given the recent decision of the 
Court of Appeal in R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051. In this case, the court distinguished be-
tween non-disclosure and active deception, emphasising that criminal liability attached only to the lat-
ter. However, in this case, and others, the distinction tends to unravel in trans contexts as, ‘mere’ non-
disclosure is readily translated into active deception. For a critique of the distinction see A. Sharpe, 
‘Criminalising Sexual Intimacy: Transgender Defendants and the Legal Construction of Non-Consent’ 
(2014) Criminal Law Review 207. It should be recognised that the obligation to disclose gender history 
is not confined to criminal law. For example, under English law, failure to disclose gender history prior 
to a marriage ceremony provides a ground for annulment of the marriage (see A. Sharpe, ‘Transgender 
Marriage and the Legal Obligation to Disclose Gender History’ (2012) 75(1) Modern Law Review 33).  
7 In the UK context, sex offenders have to register with the police every year, inform the police of any 
change of name or address and of any intention to travel outside the UK. The police can apply for or-
ders that bar offenders from certain activities and areas associated with children. In the UK, a custodial 
sentence of 30 months or more leads to indefinite detention (Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Notification 
Requirements) (England and Wales) Regulations 2012).  
8 State of Colorado v Clark (Sean O’Neill) No. 1994CR003290 (Colo. Dist Ct. Feb. 16, 1996) (on file 
with Harvard Law School Library). The defendant received a custodial sentence of three months and a 
period of probation after bing convicted of the rape of four young women, each of whom he had dated 
(J. Green, ‘Predator?’ San Francisco Bay Times, 22 Feb 1996). For discussion of the case see J.L. Nye, 
‘The Gender Box’ (1998) 13 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 226; P. Califia, Sex Changes: The Poli-
tics of Transgenderism (2nd edn, Cleis Press 2003) 234-237. State of Washington v Wheatley No. 97-1-
50056-6 (Wash. Superior Ct. 13 May 1997). Christopher Wheatley was sentenced to prison for twenty-
 
 3 
and Israel,
9
 the article will focus on the UK where there has been a recent 
spate of prosecutions. The article is important, not only because it casts 
light on the plight of a highly marginalised group of people, now ren-
dered especially vulnerable to prosecution due to legal preoccupation 
with non-disclosure of gender history as the ultimate deal breaker in sex-
ual relations, but also because it lends itself to broader criminal justice, 
human rights and ethical debates concerned with the concepts of non-
consent, harm, deception and their limits.  
 
The article contains three parts. Part 1 will preface discussion of the wis-
dom of criminalisation of non-disclosure of gender history by providing 
some background and detail concerning criminal prosecutions brought 
against young transgender men in the UK. Part 2 will highlight a number 
of important features of sexually intimate scenarios involving cisgender 
and transgender people that tend to be lost in wider discussions of the is-
sues. In particular, it will highlight how liberal legal and wider discourses 
surrounding such cases abstract their facts from the ideological context in 
which they are constructed. Part 3 will present three arguments as to why 
criminalisation is inappropriate in the present context. It will do so on the 
basis of a series of assumptions which present the case for a cisgender 
right to know at its strongest. While these assumptions are hugely prob-
lematic, as Part 2 of the article will demonstrate, they are likely to register 
with state prosecutors interpreting events through the lens of cisnorma-
tivity. Therefore it is essential, in making the case against criminalisation, 
to show its weakness even when we concede the ground that otherwise 
ought not to be conceded in legal and political struggle.  
 
1. The Legal Background 
 
Over the last three years, a series of successful sexual offence prosecu-
tions for ‘gender fraud’ have been brought in the UK.10 While all con-
                                                                                                                                            
seven months after being convicted of third degree rape. Both O’Neill and Wheatley identified as 
transgender men.  
9 Israel v Alkobi [2003] IsrDC 3341(3). Hen Alkobi, who acknowledged some gender confusion and 
self described as a ‘girl-boy,’ was convicted of false impersonation of a man and attempting to pene-
trate the complainant’s genitalia with an object and was sentenced to six months in prison, commuted 
to six months of community service and twenty-four months probation. For a discussion and critique of 
the case see A. Gross, ‘Gender Outlaws Before the Law: the Courts of the Borderland’ (2009) 32(1) 
Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 165. Amit Pundik has noted that prosecutions for sexual fraud 
generally appear to be extremely limited within continental legal systems (A. Pundik, ‘Coercion and 
Deception in Sexual Relations’ (2015) 28 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 97, 98). Cer-
tainly, prosecutions for ‘gender fraud’ appear confined to Anglo-American common law systems, or 
legal systems like Israel which are based substantially on the common law. 
10  R v Mason [2015] (unrep) The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/11959495/Woman-posed-as-a-single-father-to-con-Facebook-friend-into-sex.html (last accessed: 
 
 4 
victed defendants have expressed some ‘gender confusion,’ at least three 
appear to be transgender men or, at least, considered themselves to be so 
at the time of alleged offences. This article will focus on these three cases 
and the argumentation offered will relate specifically to instances of 
trans-cis sexual intimacy. This should not however, be taken to imply the 
appropriateness of prosecution outside this scenario. On the contrary, 
prosecution of gender queer
11
 people and/or lesbians for ‘gender fraud’ 
constitutes significant criminal law overreach. Nor should it be assumed, 
in such cases, that desire-led intimacy is non-consensual and/or that queer 
or lesbian gender performances are necessarily deceptive.  
 
In the first of the three recent cases involving transgender defendants, 
Christopher Wilson was convicted by a Scottish court of two counts of 
obtaining sexual intimacy by fraud
12
 and sentenced to three years proba-
tion and 240 hours of community service.
13
 The facts of the case are that 
the defendant, then aged 20, met two cisgender girls on separate occa-
sions. In relation to the first girl, who was either 15 or 16 at the time 
(there is uncertainty on this point), sexual contact was limited to kissing. 
Two years later, the defendant commenced a relationship with the second 
girl. She was aged 15 at the time, but told Wilson she was 16.
14
 This rela-
                                                                                                                                            
12/11/15); R v Newland [2015] (unrep) http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/15/woman-
convicted-of-impersonating-man-to-dupe-friend-into-having-sex (last accessed: 12/11/15); R v Wilson 
[2013] (unrep) BBC News 9/4/13 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-
22078298 (last accessed: 12/11/15); R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9946687/18-year-old-woman-masqueraded-as-boy-to-
get-girl-into-bed.html (last accessed: 12/11/15); R v Barker [2012] (unrep) The Daily Mail Online, 
6/3/13 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2110430/Gemma-Barker-jailed-Vctims-girl-dressed-
boy-date-speak-anguish.html (last accessed: 12/11/15). There is also the much earlier case of R v Saun-
ders [1991] (unrep) Pink Paper, 196, 12/10/91. For a discussion of the Saunders case see A.M. Smith, 
‘The Regulation of Lesbian Sexuality through Erasure: the case of Jennifer Saunders’ in J. Kay (ed) 
Lesbian Erotics (New York University Press 1995) 164-179. To my knowledge, no prosecution of this 
kind has ever been brought against a transgender woman in the UK or elsewhere. In relation to poten-
tial cisgender male complainants, this is perhaps due to more unilateral and extra-legal responses to 
‘discovery’ of the fact that one’s object of desire is not cisgender. Mason, Newland and McNally were 
all convicted of sexual assault by penetration under s. 2 of the Sexual Offences Act (SOA) 2003. This 
is a sister offence to rape under English law, covering non-penile forms of non-consensual penetration. 
Wilson was convicted of two counts of obtaining sexual intimacy by fraud under the Scottish Sexual 
Offences Act 2009. One count covered non-penile penetration, the other non-penetrative sexual touch-
ing. Barker and Saunders were convicted of sexual assault and indecent assault respectively, both be-
ing offences of non-penetrative sexual touching under s. 3 SOA 2003 and legislation repealed by the 
2003 Act.  
11 J. Nestle, et al, GenderQueer: Voices from Beyond the Sexual Binary (Alyson Books 2002).  
12 This is an odd choice of words given that there is no such offence under the Scottish Sexual Offences 
Act 2009. The most appropriate charges would appear to be s. 2 (sexual assault by penetration) in rela-
tion to use of a prosthetic device and s. 3 (sexual assault) in relation to kissing.  
13 R v Wilson [2013] (unrep).  
14 It should be noted that no charges of sex with a minor were brought. Moreover, the English Crown 
Prosecution Service do not recommend prosecution in cases of youthful sexual exploration, at least not 
in the absence of any evidence of coercion or other aggravating factors 
(http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/fact_sheets/sexual_offences/index.html) (last accessed: 12/11/15).  
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tionship culminated in penetrative vaginal intercourse by means of a 
prosthetic device. In the second case, Justine McNally
15
 was convicted of 
six counts of sexual assault by penetration
16
 and sentenced to three years 
in prison. The facts of this case are that the defendant met a cisgender girl 
via social media and developed an online relationship with her over three 
years. At this point, the defendant, then aged 17, met the girl, who was 
then aged 16, on several occasions. On two of these occasions the de-
fendant digitally and orally penetrated the girl’s vagina. In the third and 
final case, Kyran Lee (Mason) was convicted of sexual assault by pene-
tration and received a suspended sentence of two years. The facts of this 
case are that the defendant met a cisgender woman via social media. The 
parties subsequently met in person and the defendant penetrated her vagi-
na, both orally and by means of a prosthetic device.
17
  
 
All three defendants were born and remained female-bodied at the time of 
the offences. Chris Wilson and Kyran Lee (Mason) identified and pre-
sented as men prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the offences. Jus-
tine McNally identified and presented as male prior to and at the time of 
the offences. However, at the time of the trial and subsequent appeal, she 
asserted a female gender identity. It is unclear whether her disavowal of a 
male gender identity is authentic or whether it represents a retreat into 
womanhood, precipitated by criminal prosecution and media persecution 
of the 17 year old. Certainly, like Wilson, McNally, prior to reasserting a 
female identity, indicated a desire to undergo gender reassignment sur-
gery in the future.
18
 In any event, two of the three convicted defendants 
identify as transgender men, while the third genuinely did so at the rele-
vant moment of criminal liability. Further, and as apparent from the facts 
detailed, the convictions have not proved dependent on vaginal penetra-
tion of complainants. Rather, and as the Wilson case demonstrates, kiss-
ing proved sufficient to trigger criminal prosecution.
19
 It seems especially 
problematic that kissing, without coercion of any kind, can meet the 
threshold for criminal prosecution.  
 
Of course, the reader might think this to be appropriate, given the value 
we place on sexual autonomy and its relevance to determining consent.
20
 
                                                 
15 R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051.  
16 s. 2 SOA 2003.  
17 R v Mason [2015] (unrep).  
18 R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051 at [10].  
19 Use of this minimal, and problematic, prosecution threshold is also apparent in some non-trans cases, 
for example, R v Barker [2012] (unrep).  
20 In the English criminal law context, this view is most associated with Jonathan Herring (‘Mistaken 
Sex’ [2005] Crim LR 511). However, it is also supported by analytical philosophers (S. Schulofer. 
‘Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously’ (1992) 11 Law and Philosophy 35; D. Archard, Sexual Consent 
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In Part 3 of the article, the view that sexual autonomy should be consid-
ered an absolute right will be taken to task. For now, it is worth noting 
that, excepting the example of transgender, non-disclosure of information 
pertaining to group identity does not serve to vitiate consent under Eng-
lish or Scottish law,
21
 even in circumstances of penetration where concern 
over sexual autonomy might be considered especially important. Accord-
ingly, the prosecution of transgender people might be viewed as a dra-
matic example of criminal law overreach, both in terms of setting such a 
minimum threshold for prosecution and in terms of an exclusive focus on 
a single identity group. It also, perhaps, serves to call into question the 
tendency of some, including feminist, advocacy groups to rely uncritical-
ly on the criminal law as the means through which to address perceived 
human rights abuses.
22
 Certainly, in the present context, the punitiveness 
of such an approach is laid bare. Moreover, and as we will see, the dis-
tinction between, and the intelligibility of, the categories ‘victim’ and 
‘perpetrator,’ tend to unravel in the context of desire-led cis-trans intima-
cy. Having provided some legal background to sexual offence prosecu-
tions brought against transgender people in the UK, the article will now 
provide a broader ideological context to the cases, as well as some im-
portant caveats regarding state and wider cultural representation of the 
‘facts.’ 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(Westview Press 1998); A. Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge University Press 
2003). T. Dougherty, ‘Sex, Lies and Consent’ (2013) 123(4) Ethics 717). For criticism of this approach 
to sexual fraud, see H. Gross, ‘Rape, Moralism and Human Rights’ [2007] Crim LR 220; M. Bohland-
er, ‘Mistaken Consent to Sex, Political Correctness and Correct Policy’ (2007) 71(5) Journal of Crimi-
nal Law 412; Sharpe n 6 above; K. Laird, ‘Rapist or Rogue? Deception, Consent and the Sexual Of-
fences Act 2003’ [2014] Crim LR 492.  
21 However, see the Israeli case of Kashur v. State of Israel (published in Takdin, Jan. 25, 2012). In 
this case, the court convicted an Arab man of rape by fraud on the basis that he failed to disclose his 
Arab status to his Jewish female sexual partner. While the case needs to be situated within the specific 
cultural and religious context of the Israeli state in order to be properly understood, the conviction re-
mains problematic in terms of the precedent it sets. However, it should be appreciated that the defend-
ant pleaded guilty to this charge as part of a plea bargain and there appears to have been evidence of a 
violent rape and prosecutorial concern that the victim was too traumatised to testify 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11329429 (last accessed: 12/11/15). For a critique of 
the case see A. Gross, ‘Rape by Deception and the Policing of Gender and Nationality Borders’ (2015) 
24 Tulane Journal of Law and Sexuality 1.  
22 This is especially problematic in relation to feminism because reliance on criminal law requires the 
mobilisation of the carceral state and therefore teases out tensions that exist with basic tenets of femi-
nism (D.L. Martin, ‘Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform Strat-
egies’ (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 151; A. Gruber, ‘Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime’ 
(2009) 84 Washington Law Review 581). This problem of undue resort to criminal law has been de-
scribed by Janet Halley et al as “governance feminism” (‘From the International to the Local in Femi-
nist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contempo-
rary Governance Feminism’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 335, 340-342). I am not 
suggesting here a direct relationship between governance feminism and the prosecution of transgender 
men. Rather, I am suggesting that such prosecutions become more likely in a world in which women’s 
sexual autonomy is utterly juridified.  
 7 
2. Sexual ‘Misadventure’: Through the Looking Glass of Cisnormativity  
 
This Part of the article will tease out and challenge three cisnormative as-
sumptions that confer apparent legitimacy on prosecution. These assump-
tions always appear to be present in actual cases and in wider cultural 
discourses surrounding them:  
 
(i) gender history is a material fact, non-disclosure of which serves to 
vitiate consent (‘the consent claim’) 
(ii)  inadvertent sexual intimacy with transgender people is harmful 
(‘the harm claim’) 
(iii)  non-disclosure of gender history is deceptive (‘the deception 
claim’) 
 
Those who favour prosecution,
23
 do so because they readily make these 
three assumptions. And yet, if one pauses to consider what is at stake in 
each of these claims and to recognise how they proceed, somewhat effort-
lessly, from a cisnormative worldview, then the legally and culturally 
self-evident emerges as a highly edited and partial account of intimate 
moments, one that fails to consider the perspectives and experiences of 
transgender people. Let us turn to the claims made about consent, harm 
and deception. First, what does it mean to say that the consent of a cis-
gender person is lacking in the context of desire-led intimacy because the 
transgender party did not share in advance information about his/her 
past? The claim being made here is that consent is premised on the right 
to sexual freedom or autonomy and that this right requires consent to be 
informed. However, given that no scholar would suggest that this requires 
total transparency to the world, informed consent emerges as requiring 
only disclosure of facts considered material or important, either to the 
complainant or in general normative terms.  
 
A key difficulty here is that the sexual autonomy argument is mobilised 
not simply in the service of knowledge acquisition. Rather, behind the 
rhetoric of a right to know lies a legally sanctioned right to define others 
against their will. Thus when cisgender people claim, and law confers, a 
right to ‘know,’ what is glossed over is the obvious fact that contestation 
exists over the nature of the facts that are capable of being known. In my 
view, ‘apparent consent’ should be viewed as legally valid because the 
important fact, namely ‘authentic’ gender identity,24 is already in the open 
                                                 
23 See, in particular, Herring above n 20.  
24 In placing emphasis on ‘authentic’ gender identity, I am not suggesting an essentialist understanding 
of identity. Rather, while all identities are, in various senses, socially constructed, they have a reality in 
 
 8 
and there ought not to be a right to know other personal facts about the 
body and its history. To claim otherwise is, of necessity, to imbue other 
facts with a weight they ought not to bear, at least not if we wish to take 
self-determination of gender identity seriously. In the cases that have 
come before the courts, the ‘fact,’ upon which all complainants insist, is 
that the defendant is not a man. Accordingly, from a transgender perspec-
tive, the right to know is less about knowledge than its refusal. In short, 
the legal creation of this right constitutes nothing less than the ontological 
degradation of transgender people.  
 
In relation to harm, I think there is something offensive in the claim that 
desire-led cis-trans intimacy is harmful to cisgender people. This issue of 
harm will be addressed more fully in Part 3, given the centrality of harm 
to the criminalisation question. However, for present purposes, it should 
be noted that establishing harm, sufficient to justify criminal intervention, 
is unlikely to be an easy task. Moreover, it should be recognised that 
‘harm,’ in this context, involves the retrospective reconstruction of pleas-
urable acts and that subsequent distress, disgust and/or revulsion are emo-
tional responses conditioned by systemic transphobia
25
 and/or homopho-
bia. For both these reasons, we should be cautious about concluding that 
a threshold of harm, justifying criminalisation, has been met. In relation 
to deception, we should not confuse the claim with the claim about con-
sent. The claim here relates, not to whether the complainant would have 
consented had she known all the relevant ‘facts,’ but to whether the de-
fendant appreciated that she would not have consented had he disclosed 
his gender history. The difficulty here is that transgender people are con-
fronted by the powerful cisnormative assumption and conceit that no cis-
gender person would knowingly become intimate with a transgender per-
son. It is precisely this assumption that enables fanciful claims of igno-
rance, on the part of cisgender people, to be entertained by the courts. 
The assumption also serves to constitute transgender people as presump-
tively knowledgeable with regard to the consent question and therefore 
low in the ‘hierarchy of credibility’26 should we claim to have believed in 
the other party’s consent to the desire-led intimacy that occurred. Appar-
ently, the transgender person who believes that a cisgender person might 
                                                                                                                                            
lived experience. This is no less true for transgender people than it is for cisgender people. This is im-
portant to emphasise because, for transgender people, ‘realness’ proves to be especially fragile and 
contingent as both criminal prosecution and disclosure discourse demonstrate. 
25 ‘Transphobia is an emotional disgust toward individuals who do not conform to society’s gender 
expectations... The ‘phobia’ suffix is used to imply an irrational fear or hatred, one that is at least partly 
perpetuated by cultural ideology’ (D. Hill and B. Willoughby, ‘The Development and Validation of the 
Genderism and Transphobia Scale’ (2005) 53 Sex Roles 531, 532).  
26 H.S. Becker, ‘Whose Side are We on’ (1967) 14(3) Social Problems 239.  
 9 
actually want to have sex with him/her even if aware of his/her 
transgender status is by definition a fraud. It would seem then that low 
self-esteem and self-loathing are the affective signs of the truly ethical 
transgender person as legally constructed. In other words, the accusation 
of knowledge regarding consent contains, implicitly, a view of 
transgender as abject.
27
 
 
This issue of knowledge requires further consideration because we should 
not assume cisgender complainants to be unaware of the gender histories 
of transgender men. While this assumption tends to be triggered automat-
ically, cisgender claims of ignorance should not be accepted so readily. 
After all, they require a massive exercise in the suspension of disbelief. 
None of the transgender defendants in the cases detailed above had, at the 
time of the relevant sexual acts at least, undertaken gender reassignment 
surgery or commenced hormonal treatment. The latter is especially sig-
nificant because none of the defendants would have benefited from the 
significant masculinising effects of testosterone.
28
 Accordingly, we are 
expected to believe that in the context of repeated sexual intimacies, cis-
gender female complainants remained unaware of their partners’ female 
bodies. Somehow, the belief that the defendants were cisgender men sur-
vived in tact despite physical contact with bodies that were vaginaed, 
breasted and which had relatively high-pitched voices. Moreover, my 
suggestion that we (bracket) claims of cisgender ignorance is not based 
only on common sense, but also on evidence actually presented in some 
of the cases under consideration. Thus, for example, in McNally, the de-
fendant claimed that the complainant had discovered the facts about gen-
der identity over a year before they physically met.
29
 It was also claimed 
that the complainant commented on McNally’s breasts and ‘high pitched 
voice.’30 In these respects, the bringing of complaints may have had less 
to do with consent obtained by fraud and more to do with repressed lesbi-
an desire and/or parental pressure informed by homophobia. This concern 
is also supported by the earlier case of Saunders, where evidence was 
presented that the complainant had asked Saunders to ‘pass as her boy-
friend as she did not want [her parents] to know the “truth” about her 
sexuality.’31  
                                                 
27 J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (Columbia University Press 1984).  
28 In terms of changes likely to be visible, transgender men prescribed testosterone typically experience 
increases in muscle, body and facial hair, as well some degree of deepening of the voice (World Pro-
fessional Association of Transgender Health, Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, 
Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People (7th Edn, WPATH 2012) 36).  
29 R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051 at [12].  
30 ibid [42].  
31 Gross above n 9 173. It should also be noted that it may, at least in some cases, be ‘gender disso-
nance’ that lies at the heart of attraction (J. Butler, Gender Trouble (Routledge, 1990) 122-123). While 
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The assumption regarding deception also proves to be an effect of a focus 
on, and a misunderstanding of, ‘confusion’ over gender identity. Thus, in 
McNally, gender identification proved inconsistent.
32
 It is important how-
ever, not to deny masculine gender identity simply because of apparently 
inconsistent or ambiguous testimony. After all, ‘gender confusion’ is not 
uncommon among transgender youth and should not be viewed as evi-
dence of gender inauthenticity. Moreover, and as noted earlier, McNally 
may have retreated into womanhood, consequent upon police prosecution 
and media persecution. The idea that McNally might have sublimated 
masculine identity and desire in the face of a legal and cultural world in 
which transgender and deception are viewed as synonymous,
33
 is one that 
finds support in medical evidence dealing with rates of gender persis-
tence. Thus, while many young children exhibiting gender variant behav-
iour do not go on to identify as transgender as adults, those insisting on 
non birth-designated gender identities after adolescence have a very high 
rate of persistence into adulthood.
34
 Certainly, we should not overlook the 
enormous pressure cisnormativity exerts on vulnerable transgender youth. 
In any event, McNally appears to have genuinely identified as male at the 
time of the offences. Therefore criminal liability ought not to have been 
founded on ‘gender fraud.’  
 
It is also important to recognise how a focus on stable binary gender iden-
tity can produce injustice beyond the treatment of transgender defendants. 
That is, there is a real danger here that cisnormative understandings of 
gender, identity and authenticity will expand the net of criminalisation 
beyond the example of transgender, even on the limited question of gen-
der identity ‘fraud.’ Thus, for example, a woman who identifies as gender 
queer might perform gender in a masculine way. However, her perfor-
mance is not deceptive. She does not act inauthentically, nor is she moti-
vated by a desire to deceive. On the contrary, gender queer is precisely 
the gender identity position that she occupies and lives. She should not be 
punished because a sexual partner mistakenly assumes her to be male. 
                                                                                                                                            
beyond the immediate concerns of this article, we should perhaps consider, as Gross urges us to, ‘the 
extent to which uncertainty about identity, blurring of gender lines, and loss of control over all the in-
formation are part of the world of desire’ (203).  
32 R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051 at [47]. 
33 T.M. Bettcher, ‘Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of 
Illusion’ (2007) 22(3) Hypatia 43.  
34 B. Wren, ‘Early physical Intervention for Young People with Atypical Gender Identity Develop-
ment’ (2000) 5 Clin Child Psychol Psychiatry 220; KJ. Zucker, ‘Gender Identity Disorder’ in  D.A. 
Wolfe and E.J. Mash (eds) Behavioral and Emotional Disorders in Adolescents: Nature, Assessment, 
and Treatment (Guilford Press 2006) 535–562; K.J. Zucker and P.T. Cohen-Kettenis, ‘Gender Identity 
Disorder in Children and Adolescents’ in D.L. Rowland and L. Incrocci (eds) Handbook of Sexual and 
Gender Identity Disorders (John Wiley & Sons 2008) 376–422. 
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Crucially, we should recognise the very real danger of coupling truth with 
gender performances that faithfully and consistently replicate the gender 
binary, a binary which is, after all, more ideological than real.
35
   
 
3. Responding to the Punitive State 
 
In this Part of the article we turn to arguments against criminalisation. It 
will be argued that the argument in favour of criminalisation is not 
clinched even if we concede cisnormative assumptions concerning con-
sent, harm & knowledge. This is because justification of criminalisation 
depends not only on establishing a consent-based right to know, a degree 
of harm and culpability. It is also necessary to demonstrate that the case 
for criminalisation is not outweighed by other considerations. I will argue 
that criminalisation of non-disclosure of gender history is inappropriate 
for at least three reasons:  
 
(1) it produces legal inconsistency and is potentially discriminatory, 
(2) sexual autonomy should not be viewed as an absolute right, 
(3) there are compelling public policy reasons against criminalisation.  
 
Objection 1: Prosecution produces Legal Inconsistency and is Potentially 
Discriminatory  
 
The young transgender men convicted of sexual offences were all con-
victed on the basis of fraud. Yet, convictions for sexual offences on the 
basis of fraud are rare under English law as they are within Anglo-
American and European legal systems more generally. In the absence of 
coercion they are rarer still. The forms of non-disclosure that do not serve 
to vitiate consent for the purposes of sexual offences under English law 
range widely from false declarations of love to HIV+ status.
36
 They are 
likely to include non-disclosure of facts concerning racial or ethnic status, 
disability, past sexual experience, drug addiction, religious faith and 
criminal convictions. The list is potentially endless. All of these facts may 
be ones sexual partners wish to know.  
 
Yet, in all these and many other circumstances law views consent as le-
gally valid. Of course, one might argue that consent provisions should be 
interpreted so as to include these and/or other forms of non-disclosure. In 
                                                 
35
 J. Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (Routledge, 1993).  
36 Under English law, non-disclosure of HIV+ status may lead to a successful prosecution for non-fatal 
assault, but not for a sexual offence where consent is presumed to be present: R v Dica [2004] EWCA 
Crim 1103; R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706.  
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other words, it might be said that the problem is one of under-regulation. 
Nevertheless, the problem of inconsistency remains. Moreover, the tar-
geting of gender history, as opposed to other types of historical infor-
mation, and the fact that it is only the gender histories of transgender 
people rather than people at large (for we all have gender histories) with 
which law appears to be concerned,
37
 points to the possibility that prose-
cution might constitute discrimination under Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights coupled with Article 8. Of course, it might 
be argued that knowledge concerning gender history is likely to be more 
important to sexual partners than other facts. This might be so, though it 
is properly an empirical question. It may be, for example, that race or re-
ligion are just as important, at least for some people. However, what we 
need to remember is that this type of argument is not really about a right 
to know the truth, but a right to define truth. If gender identity has special 
importance, as claimed, it is because cisgender people insist on defining 
us in terms of birth-designated sex, and/or on erecting hierarchies of men 
and women. In terms of developing international human rights jurispru-
dence, we must draw a clear and non-negotiable line in relation to self-
determination of gender identity.  
 
Objection 2: Sexual Autonomy should not be viewed as an Absolute 
Right 
 
In this section, it will be argued that we should not view sexual autonomy 
as an absolute right. In relation to cisgender women’s right to choose with 
whom they have sex, this is, for many, tantamount to feminist heresy. In 
relation to cis-trans intimacy however, challenging orthodoxy is not 
merely an act of rebellion, but one of necessity. This article will highlight 
privacy and/or human dignity as limits to sexual autonomy. However, we 
should recognise that transgender people also value and have an interest 
in sexual autonomy. This is a point often overlooked in discussion of the 
present issue. And yet, surely it cannot be said that control of personal in-
formation concerning administration of hormones, the undertaking of 
surgeries and earlier coerced gender performances are divorced from this 
right. After all, informational privacy concerning the body, its history and 
surgical alteration impact on both the context and the experience of sexu-
al intimacy. Of course, it might be said that “in the context of sexual in-
timacy, the right not to associate trumps the right to associate.”38 In the 
                                                 
37 The exclusive focus on the gender identities of transgender as opposed to cisgender people is an ef-
fect of cisnormative ideas about gender realness and artifice (Serrano above n 5).  
38 S. Colb, ‘Is There a Moral Duty to Disclose that You’re Transgender to a Potential Partner?’ Verdict 
18 June 2015 https://verdict.justia.com/2015/06/18/is-there-a-moral-duty-to-disclose-that-youre-
transgender-to-a-potential-partner (last accessed: 12/11/15).  
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context of rape-by-force, this claim is unarguable. In the context of ‘sex-
ual fraud’ the matter is much more complicated as we will see, and this is 
especially so in the case of non-disclosure of information. Thus, state 
emphasis on the protection of sexual autonomy does not necessarily justi-
fy criminal prosecution. But even if cisgender autonomy was found to 
trump transgender autonomy in the context of sexual intimacy, a legal re-
quirement to disclose gender history provokes other rights conflicts.  
 
The legal obligation to disclose gender history to sexual partners requires 
the disclosure of highly personal and private information. Accordingly, it 
might be viewed as breaching rights to privacy
39
 and/or human dignity.
40
 
If so, it becomes necessary to balance rights
41
 and the harms likely to 
flow from disregarding them. Indeed, criminalisation ought to be preced-
ed by a balancing of harms even where no conflicting right can be identi-
fied, as harm minimisation ought to be a key consideration in such calcu-
lations. Accordingly, in order to conclude that a right to sexual autonomy 
requires the disclosure of gender history, it should be demonstrated, by 
those who favour prosecution, that potential or actual harm suffered by 
cisgender people is (a) significant and (b) outweighs the harm to 
transgender people associated with disclosure. Without the possibility of 
significant consequential harm it is difficult to see why an informational 
right to know gender history should operate as a trump card.  
 
According to the testimony of complainants in cases that have come be-
fore the courts, harm suffered appears to consist in feelings of distress, 
disgust or revulsion. Thus in McNally, and according to prosecuting 
counsel, the complainant felt ‘literally sickened’ upon discovery. A ques-
tion arises here as to whether we are actually in the territory of harm, as 
opposed to mere offence.
42
 If not, then a further objection to criminalisa-
tion has been identified. If we are in the territory of harm, and if harm 
minimisation is our goal, it remains necessary to balance such harms 
against those likely to be suffered by transgender people. Disclosing gen-
der history is not an act undertaken without risks. Coming out as 
transgender exposes a person to considerable and well-documented phys-
                                                 
39 Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights.  
40 Article 1, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; Article 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
These provisions emphasise the ‘intrinsic worth’ of persons and the ‘respect and concern’ that should 
be afforded them.  
41 In relation to Article 8, paragraph 2 alludes to this balancing act in justifying state infringement of 
the right to privacy in specified circumstances.  
42 J. Feinberg, Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (vol 1) (Oxford University Press 
1984).   
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ical risks.
43
 We need only think of the tragic case of Brandon Teena, so 
graphically illustrated in the film, Boys Don’t Cry. This concern is per-
haps intensified in relation to transgender youth and therefore in relation 
to all defendants prosecuted so far.  
 
In addition to the not inconsiderable physical risks, we need to recognise 
the psychological and emotional impact of disclosure. For many 
transgender people, having to disclose their chromosomal status, present 
and/or past genital and/or gonadal condition as well as a history of co-
erced gender performance is a source of pain and trauma. Finally, a bal-
ancing of harms requires recognition of the fact that complainant distress, 
disgust and revulsion are emotional responses conditioned by systemic 
transphobia and/or homophobia, and for this reason also should not be 
viewed as sufficient in meeting a threshold of harm justifying criminal 
intervention, and especially not to target a vulnerable minority group.  
 
Objection 3: A Public Policy Objection 
 
In thinking of prosecution in broader public policy terms it is necessary to 
develop the theme of transphobia and the state’s interest in reducing it. It 
is instructive here to draw on the analogy of race because once we shift 
our attention from non-disclosure of gender history to non-disclosure of 
racial status our concern for, and law’s interest in, sexual autonomy tends 
to wane. The point here is not to redraw attention to the inconsistencies of 
law, which formed the basis of objection 1. Rather, it is to highlight state 
complicity in generating precisely what the state is committed, at least 
ostensibly, to overcoming in public policy and anti-discrimination law 
terms.   
 
Consider the following example:  
 
A white woman and a man of mixed race, who outwardly appears 
white, meet in a wine bar. They flirt with each other. The woman in-
vites the man to her apartment where mutually satisfying sex takes 
place. Subsequently, the woman discovers the mixed-race background 
of the man and claims to feel violated. She reports the matter to the po-
lice and requests that the man be charged with rape on the basis of his 
failure to disclose his racial background.  
                                                 
43 In the UK context, Whittle et al found that ‘in every sphere of life’ transgender people ‘are subject to 
high levels of abuse and violence’ (S. Whittle et al, The Equalities Review: Engendered Penalties: 
Transgender and Transsexual People’s Experiences of Inequality & Discrimination (Press for Change 
2007) 23).  
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There are people who would consider a rape charge an appropriate out-
come on these facts, and certainly in circumstances where the man was 
aware in advance of the woman's racist feelings. However, for the rest of 
us, such a suggestion seems not only counter-intuitive, but offensive. For-
tunately, such a prosecution would never get off the ground and, if it did, 
would certainly fail to secure a conviction under English law. Yet, in the 
context of cis-trans intimacy, the legal position is obviously quite differ-
ent. It would seem that the intolerance that we rightly bring to expres-
sions of racism in our society deserts us when we are asked to accommo-
date the fact of gender variance. If you are a racist, the legal message ap-
pears to be: do not go around assuming people to be of a particular race 
or ethnicity. For, if you do, you might be disappointed. Conversely, if you 
are a transphobe, the legal message is: assume everybody to be cisgender 
and if your unreasonable assumption fails to accord with reality, feel free 
to channel your sense of outrage through the criminal law.  
The view that it is appropriate to prosecute transgender men for non-
disclosure of gender history is one that takes the sexual autonomy of cis-
gender people too seriously, viewing it in near absolute terms. Such a 
conclusion requires us to trump a public policy concern to counter tran-
sphobia. In view of the mixed race example above, it might be objected 
that equating transphobia with racism in this context only works if mind-
ing about gender history is as transphobic as minding about race is racist. 
This is precisely my argument. The fact that it provokes resistance re-
veals not the falseness of the argument but society’s failure to take tran-
sphobia as seriously as it does racism in this specific context of sexual in-
timacy. Resistance to this argument ultimately resides in the view that 
while a black man is both black (though not necessarily visibly so) and a 
man, a transgender man is not a man. It is precisely this view of 
transgender people as artificial men and women that must be resisted, not 
replicated by law. Of course, we should all be free to choose with whom 
we become sexually intimate, though we might want to workshop an 
aversion to a particular class of people. But once a desire-led choice has 
been acted upon, the actor should not be able to disown it or be permitted 
to reframe an ensuing pleasurable sexual exchange as the rightful object 
of criminal law, at least not when gender presentation accords with gen-
der self-identity.  
 
Moreover, the fact that a cisgender person minds about gender history, 
should not translate into the assumption that a transgender person must 
have appreciated this fact. There is no reason to assume knowledge here, 
or indeed that transgender people would want to have sex with a tran-
sphobe. The fact that this assumption tends to be readily made points not 
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to deceit, but to an unacknowledged, and empirically false, conceit that 
no cisgender person would knowingly become intimate with a 
transgender person. For all these reasons, and especially where society is 
being asked to accommodate prejudice, we should perhaps give full reign 
to caveat amator or let the lover beware.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has considered a series of recent cases where young 
transgender men have been successfully prosecuted for sexual offences in 
circumstances where their female cisgender partners claimed to be una-
ware of their gender histories. These prosecutions have been based on the 
assumptions that in these circumstances, consent is lacking, harm is occa-
sioned and deception is present. The article teased out how each of these  
legal and cultural assumptions is deeply problematic and an effect of a 
cisnormative interpretation of the ‘facts.’ The article argued that even if 
contested claims around consent, harm and deception were conceded, the 
case against criminalisation would remain overwhelming. Ultimately, 
prosecutions of this kind demonstrate the need to limit the right to sexual 
autonomy. To see this right in near absolute terms is an act of hubris.  
 
What we ought to scrutinise is not transgender reticence to disclose high-
ly personal information, but cisgender demands to know. For the demand 
to know is not simply an invasion of privacy for the purposes of discover-
ing objective facts. On the contrary, cisgender demands to know presup-
pose an already constructed set of facts which rob transgender people of 
self-definitional agency. The likelihood of further prosecutions will re-
main as long as transgender continues to be understood as a synonym for 
duplicity, subterfuge and dissimulation. It is precisely this legal and cul-
tural view to which criminal prosecutions contribute. Therefore what we 
need to confront as scholars and activists is not simply the concrete fact 
of prosecution, urgent though that obligation is, but the view that non-
disclosure of gender history is unethical. Future research in this area 
needs to consider sexual ethics, the question of what we owe to each oth-
er in our sexual relations. And in exploring this question, we need to strip 
away our cisnormative and heteronormative assumptions that might oth-
erwise appropriate the place of the ethical.  
 
 
 
